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Introduction and summary
The years 1995 through 2007 saw a boom and bust in 
home prices and purchase activity in the United States. 
There has been a lot of attention paid to the causes of 
the boom–bust cycle and who, or what, is to blame.1 
Some have blamed the cycle on subprime lending and 
the securitization of home mortgages (see, for example, 
Mian and Sufi, 2009; Keys et al., 2010; and Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert, 2009).2 During the latter years of the 
boom, both subprime lending and securitization ex-
panded significantly. By 2005, subprime lending was 
over six times as large as its pre-2000 peak, and over-
all securitization was more than twice its pre-2000 peak.3 
But these changes, and the housing cycle in general, 
were not uniform across the country. The expansion of 
lending and the subsequent problems in housing mar-
kets were more extreme in some markets than in others 
(Mian and Sufi, 2009), in part possibly because of 
changes in home prices. Home prices rose much more 
rapidly in some markets than in others, both in percent-
age terms and relative to fundamentals (see, for example, 
Haines and Rosen, 2007). Differences across markets 
may occur because of market conditions and the core 
attractiveness of a market (see, for example, Gyourko, 
Mayer, and Sinai, 2006). However, they may also  
reflect differences in the composition of lenders in par-
ticular markets. This article explores how the charac-
teristics of mortgages varied over time and across 
markets and how these differences relate to the com-
position of lenders in the markets.4 The characteristics 
I focus on are measures of loan risk and borrower qual-
ity. I examine how these differ across mortgages issued 
by different types of lenders and how shifts in mortgage 
shares among lender types in local markets affected 
standards of lenders in those markets.5 
I focus on the lender that originates, or originally 
funds, a mortgage. The primary division of lenders  
is into banks (that is, depository institutions) and  
independent mortgage banks (IMBs). Banks and IMBs 
differ in corporate strategy and regulation, both of 
which may affect their approach to participating in 
mortgage lending, including the characteristics of the 
mortgages they issue and the borrowers they issue 
them to. Mortgage lending generally plays a much 
larger role at IMBs than at banks; unlike IMBs, many 
banks tend to view mortgages as just one part of a 
broader strategy. Banks typically have branch networks 
to attract deposit customers, and mortgages may form 
only a part of their asset portfolios. In part because the 
presence of branches can affect the way banks com-
pete for mortgage borrowers, I subdivide banks by 
whether or not they have branches in the local market 
being considered (local banks versus nonlocal banks). 
Local banks may be able to use their branches’ pres-
ence to help them capture potential borrowers. Over 
the past 15 years, the market shares of the three types 
of lenders (local banks, nonlocal banks, and IMBs) 
have shifted by as much as 15 percentage points. From 
1995 through mid-2006, the share of mortgages made 
by local banks trended down. Initially, local banks lost 
market share to IMBs, but starting in 2001, mortgages 
issued by nonlocal banks began to make up a large 
share of total mortgages in many markets. Finally, 
there was a massive readjustment away from mortgages 
made by IMBs starting in mid-2006, slightly after the 
housing market bust had begun.6
The way I divide lenders in this article reflects 
important differences across lenders in the mortgage 
delivery process. How borrowers are matched with 
lenders and how mortgages are ultimately financed 3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(two key elements) typically differ across the three types 
of lenders I focus on. A potential borrower wanting a 
mortgage has the option of contacting a bank or IMB 
directly. For example, a borrower who wants to find 
out about lending terms and conditions could visit local 
bank branches and talk with a loan officer. Alterna-
tively, the borrower could use the services of a mort-
gage broker. A mortgage broker is an independent 
agent who serves as a contact between borrowers and 
lenders, arranging loans but not actually lending money. 
The broker can offer borrowers a menu of loan products 
from different lenders.7 According to one study, mort-
gage brokers helped arrange 68 percent of all residen-
tial mortgages in 2004.8 Brokers make it easier and less 
expensive for lenders with no physical presence in a 
market to lend in the market. This can potentially help 
both banks and IMBs expand. Often, the use of brokers 
is referred to as wholesale lending (as opposed to retail 
lending, where originators connect directly with borrow-
ers, often when customers visit a bank branch or have 
a pre-existing relationship with the lender).9 The expec-
tation is that most IMBs and nonlocal banks operate 
in the wholesale lending market, while local banks 
rely on a mix of retail and wholesale lending (although, 
clearly, there are variations in strategy across banks 
of the same type).
As noted previously, many loans are securitized. 
Traditionally, the primary option for a potential home 
purchaser who needed a loan was to go to a local bank. 
Typically, the bank would hold the loan in its asset port-
folio, financing it using its own deposits. This put a 
natural limit on the ability of the bank to issue mort-
gages. In the securitization process, the bank or other 
lender that initially funds the loan quickly sells it to a 
third party. The third party then uses a pool of mort-
gages as the collateral backing a bond issue. The bonds, 
known as mortgage-backed securities, are sold to in-
vestors (see Rosen, 2007b). The ability to easily sell 
mortgages means that the originating lender can finance 
a larger volume of loans with its capital. The costs and 
risks of originating mortgages for lenders that plan to 
securitize them are different than for lenders that plan 
to keep the loans in their portfolios. This difference may 
affect how the lenders compete for borrowers. While 
securitization made it easier for all lenders to expand, 
it is likely to be more important for those lenders with-
out a strong deposit base, especially IMBs. 
The ties between mortgage brokerage and securi-
tization, on the one hand, and lender competition and 
lending market standards, on the other hand, are both 
direct and indirect. The presence of mortgage brokers, 
at least those who act in the interests of the home buyers 
(see note 7), should increase the competitiveness of 
lenders. This could mean lower mortgage rates, but it 
also could mean that other mortgage terms are relaxed, 
such as allowing applicants to take out larger mortgages 
than their incomes might readily support or mortgages 
that are significantly higher than the value of the homes 
they are buying. It is plausible that increased compe-
tition among lenders contributed to such developments 
as the 125 percent loan-to-value mortgages offered 
during the housing boom. Securitization also can in-
crease the competition for mortgages. The expansion 
of securitization in the 1990s and the early part of the 
2000s meant that the risk that a lender would not be 
able to sell a loan was reduced; also, the time a lender 
was forced to hold the loan before selling it as part of 
the securitization process likely fell. This made it less 
risky, and therefore less expensive, for lenders to enter 
new markets and expand. However, securitization also 
benefits from economies of scale. This led to industry 
consolidation. In 1995, the ten largest mortgage origi-
nators made 25.3 percent of all mortgages; by 2005, it 
was 32.7 percent.10 Thus, the net impact of securitiza-
tion on lender competitiveness is unclear.
It is likely that the mortgage delivery system, in-
cluding the use of brokers on the front end and securiti-
zation on the back end, affects how lenders compete, 
including how lending market standards are set. How-
ever, the lack of data makes it difficult to directly tie 
brokerages and the rest of the mortgage delivery system 
to market conditions. The primary data on mortgages 
come from the information lenders are required to re-
port to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA). The HMDA data identify lenders and give 
some information on the disposition of a mortgage, 
but they do not include information on how a mortgage 
applicant connects with a lender, including whether a 
broker was involved in the lending process. The sup-
plementary data on mortgages that I use in this article—
from Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied 
Analytics (formerly known as McDash Analytics)—
also do not have information on the front end of the 
mortgage process. The best option I have is to use  
information on lenders as a proxy for the mortgage 
origination processes they use—and thus the lenders’ 
effect on lending market competition and conditions.
I use HMDA and LPS data to examine both how 
mortgage characteristics differ by lender type and how 
the distribution of lender types within a market affects 
mortgage characteristics in the market. I find that, on 
average, banks make ex ante safer loans than IMBs 
do, both on an absolute scale and relative to IMBs in 
the counties where they lend. Also, mortgages issued 
by banks have lower loan-to-income ratios and lower 4 1Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
loan-to-value ratios, and banks’ borrowers have high-
er FICO (Fair Isaac Corporation) scores.11 Among 
banks, I find that local banks make safer loans than 
nonlocal banks do, with nonlocal banks falling be-
tween local banks and IMBs.
I examine how the shift in lending in a market from 
one type of lender to another affects all the lenders in 
a market. This gives an indication of whether lender 
type affects how a firm competes. If lender type does 
not matter, then the shift in lending should have no 
impact. I find that a shift in lending toward a particu-
lar type of lender is associated with a larger change in 
lending standards at that type of lender than at other 
types of lenders. The interesting thing is that when a 
particular category of lender increases its share in a 
local mortgage market, that category of lender makes 
mortgages with higher loan risk, but to borrowers who 
are, on average, of higher quality. For example, when 
the mortgage share of local banks in a market increases, 
those banks issue mortgages with higher loan-to-income 
and loan-to-value ratios (higher loan risk), but to bor-
rowers with higher FICO scores (lower borrower risk). 
The impact of a change in the share of mortgages issued 
by a particular type of lender on other types of lend-
ers is much weaker. So, for example, a shift in the 
share of mortgages issued from local banks to IMBs 
has a generally insignificant impact on loan standards 
at nonlocal banks.
I also examine whether large metropolitan areas 
are different from less densely populated areas. Sepa-
rating counties (markets) into those in large metro-
politan statistical areas (MSAs) and those in small 
MSAs,12 I find that the impact of an increase in the share 
of a particular category of lender on that category’s 
lending standards is weaker in the large-MSA counties 
than in the small-MSA counties.
Data 
The primary source of mortgage data that I use 
comes from information that lenders are required to 
report under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. HMDA 
mandates that lenders report data for the vast majority 
of mortgage applications.13 For each application, the 
HMDA data provide the name of the lender, its type, 
and loan information, including the location of the 
borrower. Lenders are required to report information 
on all types of residential mortgages, including loans 
used for purchases of single-family homes, loans used 
for purchases of multifamily dwellings, loans to refi-
nance existing mortgages, and loans for home im-
provement. To make the comparisons in this article  
as revealing as possible, I restrict the sample to loans 
used for purchases of single-family homes and, within 
single-family loans, drop both second mortgages and 
home equity lines.14 For most of the analysis, I separate 
lenders by whether or not they also take deposits. In-
stitutions that both make loans and take deposits are 
regulated and chartered differently from those that 
only make loans. The deposit-taking institutions, which 
I generically refer to as banks, comprise commercial 
banks, thrift banks, and credit unions.15 I refer to the 
non-deposit-taking lenders as independent mortgage 
banks, and this category includes specialized mortgage 
lenders and independent finance companies.
One important drawback of the HMDA data is that 
a lender is classified without regard for whether the lender 
is the subsidiary of a different kind of institution. So, 
a mortgage made by a mortgage bank that is the sub-
sidiary of a commercial bank holding company is classi-
fied by HMDA in the IMB category. Instead, I classify 
lenders by the type of lender that their parent organi-
zation is. This assumes that major strategic choices are 
made at the parent organization level. This also assumes 
that where a lender books a mortgage is a matter of 
lender policy, meaning, for example, that some parent 
organizations book these loans at a bank subsidiary, while 
others book them at a mortgage bank subsidiary.16
In this article, I use quarterly HMDA data from 
1995 through 2007. During this period, total mortgages 
issued increased from 1995 through the third quarter 
of 2005 (see figure 1). However, the rate of increase 
was not constant. From 1995 through 1999 (the early 
run-up period), home purchases increase at a rate of 
8.4 percent. This falls to a rate of 3.8 percent from 2000 
through 2003 (the mid run-up period), before rocket-
ing up at a rate of 11.9 percent from 2004 through the 
third quarter of 2005 (the late run-up period). From 
the fourth quarter of 2005 through 2007 (the housing 
bust), there is a sharp decline in home purchases. The 
pattern is superficially similar to the pattern in home 
prices, as indicated by the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency’s (FHFA) House Price Index (HPI), also re-
ported in figure 1.17 But home prices increased faster 
during the 2000–03 period than during the 1995–99 
period (see, for example, Haines and Rosen, 2007,  
for a discussion of home price changes). 
There is likely to be a difference in how banks 
connect with potential borrowers, depending on their 
presence in a market. Potential borrowers connect with 
a bank because of a pre-existing relationship, such as 
a checking or savings account. They may also walk 
into (or phone) one of the bank’s branches. These two 
approaches are likely to be correlated with the bank 
having a physical presence (that is, a branch) in the 
borrower’s local market. I define a mortgage as com-
ing from a local bank if the lending bank has a branch 5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
in the county where the home pur-
chased with the mortgage is located. 
Alternatively, a borrower may use  
a mortgage broker (or an Internet 
equivalent) to help choose a lender. 
Brokers allow a bank to make mort-
gages without having a physical 
presence to attract customers. I de-
fine a mortgage as coming from a 
nonlocal bank if the lending bank 
has no branches in the county where 
the home purchased with the mort-
gage is located. While I do not know 
whether a borrower has a pre-exist-
ing relationship with a bank, walks 
into a branch, or uses a broker, I as-
sume that it is more likely that a loan 
from a local bank is made through 
a branch or pre-existing relationship 
(that is, the retail channel). The vast 
majority of loans made by nonlocal 
banks (and IMBs) come through 
brokers (that is, the wholesale chan-
nel). In the entire sample, 28.46 
percent of mortgages are made by 
local banks and 40.45 percent are 
made by nonlocal banks (of course, 
a bank can be a local bank in some 
markets and a nonlocal bank in other 
markets).18
Figure 2 shows the share of 
mortgages made by local banks, 
nonlocal banks, and IMBs over the 
sample period. The share of mort-
gages made by local banks declined 
steadily from 1995 through the third 
quarter of 2006, that is, during the 
period when housing prices rose and 
into the start of the housing bust.  
In the first quarter of 1995, local 
banks had a share of 34.26 percent 
of the mortgages made, but by mid-
2006, this share had decreased to 
23.84 percent. In 1995–99 (the early 
run-up period), the drop in the num-
ber of mortgages made by local 
banks was balanced by the rise in 
the number of mortgages made by 
nonlocal banks. But as home prices 
began to increase at a faster pace, 
the share of mortgages made by IMBs 
began to rise. At the start of 2000, 
IMBs had a share of 26.68 percent 
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of the mortgages made, but this 
quickly increased to 37.10 percent 
in the first quarter of 2005. Starting 
in late 2005, as home prices began 
to fall and private securitization 
markets shut down, these patterns 
reversed. By the end of 2007, the 
share of mortgages made by local 
banks increased to 37.90 percent, 
while the share of mortgages made 
by IMBs fell to 21.59 percent. Note 
that the decline in IMB share in 
2006–07 is at least partially due to 
the failure of American Home 
Mortgage and several other IMBs.
Up to now, I have been exam-
ining mortgages issued by lenders. 
But HMDA data also include re-
cords for mortgage applications 
that are denied. One focus of this 
article is to examine how lender 
competition affects the characteris-
tics of loans that are made. For the 
most part, I treat the denial rate as 
if it is a loan characteristic, viewing 
it as a signal of the aggregate riski-
ness of loans that are granted. A 
lower denial rate may mean higher loan or borrower 
risk. To the extent that we do not perfectly observe 
loan and borrower risks, the denial rate can serve as a 
proxy for them. Figure 3 reports the percentage of mort-
gage applications that are denied by lender type.19 The 
mortgage denial rate of local banks was flat for most 
of the sample period, only showing the beginning of 
an increase when home prices fell toward the end of 
the sample. The mortgage denial rate of nonlocal banks 
dropped sharply as home prices began to rise more 
quickly in 2000: The denial rate fell from 40.22 percent 
in the second quarter of 2000 to 13.44 percent in the 
second quarter of 2002. The denial rate of nonlocal 
banks then drifted up to about 25 percent by the end of 
the sample, in 2007. IMBs followed a similar pattern 
to that of nonlocal banks, perhaps because both groups 
are wholesale lenders, getting most of their loans from 
mortgage brokers. As I noted before, while local banks 
may get some applicants through brokers, they can also 
appeal to people with whom they have a pre-existing 
relationship or to people who visit a local branch.
The differences in mortgage denial rates across 
lenders, and possibly across time, likely reflect in part 
differences in applicant quality. They may also result 
from variation in the types of mortgages that applicants 
want. To examine whether these differences affect the 
mortgages that are granted, I need additional data. 
The HMDA data include information on the amount 
of each loan and the income of the borrower that I use 
to get the ratio of loan amount to income. However, 
to go further, I incorporate data from another source.
As I mentioned before, to supplement the HMDA 
data, I get information on loan details and borrower 
quality from LPS Applied Analytics, which collects 
data from a number of large loan servicers. These 
data include detailed information on mortgage char-
acteristics and payments, as well as on the borrower. 
The LPS data contain information on the mortgage at 
origination and a monthly record of its status. I match 
the LPS data to the HMDA data. Because of data lim-
itations, it is not possible to match an LPS observation 
with each HMDA record. The final merged data set 
matches 38.6 percent of the LPS records and 18.4 percent 
of the HMDA records. The matched records are broadly 
representative of the LPS sample. The proportion of 
different lender types is similar, as is the mean loan-
to-income ratio. However, the merged data underrep-
resent certain loans in the HMDA data. Because LPS 
Applied Analytics only gets data from a limited number 
of large servicers, it misses many loans kept in portfolio 
by smaller banks or serviced by smaller servicers. 
The LPS data also underrepresent subprime loans 
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(see the discussion later on this). Finally, the share  
of loans in HMDA data that are matched to LPS  
data increases over the sample period, paralleling  
the increased servicer coverage by LPS.
Differences across lender types 
In this section, I present information on how  
various loan and borrower characteristics differ across 
lender types. Again, I focus on three lender types: local 
banks, nonlocal banks, and IMBs. Banks include all 
depository institutions (commercial banks, thrift banks, 
and credit unions); when appropriate, I discuss the 
different depository institutions.
The differences in mortgage characteristics across 
lender types are presented in three different ways in 
table 1. Panel A of table 1 presents full sample means. 
For each variable, I take the mean for each quarter of 
the sample period. The mean and standard deviation 
of the quarterly means are reported in panel A. I take 
the mean of quarterly means rather than the mean of the 
entire sample because the number of loans increases 
over time, and I do not want the means to overweight 
the latter part of the sample. One issue with using these 
means to compare lender types is that lender types are 
not uniformly distributed across markets. As a control 
for this, I take the average of each variable for each local 
market in each quarter, using counties as local markets. 
Panel B of table 1 reports the average difference be-
tween the local market average for a lender type and that 
market’s average for all lenders. This is informative about 
how loans differ across lender types. For example, the 
proportion of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs)20 at local 
banks is 77.17 percent, which is 0.29 percentage points 
lower than the average proportion of fixed-rate mortgages 
at all lenders (seventh row in panel A). Does this mean 
that local banks give too few fixed-rate mortgages? Not 
necessarily. As shown in panel B (sixth row), local banks 
give 2.45 percentage points more fixed-rate mortgages 
than the average of lenders in the markets they are in. 
This suggests that lenders in markets with many local 
banks issued a smaller percentage of fixed-rate mortgages 
than did lenders in other markets. Finally, as figure 1 
(p. 5) shows, the sample period includes a period of in-
creasing sales and prices followed by a period of declin-
ing sales and prices. Rather than chart every variable, 
I report the sample averages for three interesting quarters 
in panel C of table 1. I show the values in the first period 
a variable is in the sample; the fourth quarter of 2004, 
to reflect the peak of sales and prices; and the fourth 
quarter of 2007, to observe the effects of the declining 
sales and prices. In general, the three different ways 
of looking at the data indicate the same patterns, but  
I discuss them in more detail when they do not. 
I use the data in table 1 to examine how mort-
gage characteristics differ by lender type. In doing 
this, it is useful to divide mortgage characteristics 
roughly into three groups. The first is loan risk. These 
are the features that have to do with risk introduced 
by the size of the mortgage. The second is borrower 
quality. These characteristics measure the risk of the 
borrower more than the mortgage itself. There will be 
some overlap in the first two groups. Finally, I include 
some variables that are likely to be more weakly cor-
related to loan or borrower risk. 
The first characteristic is the ratio of the loan amount 
to the borrower’s income. Borrowers with a larger loan 
relative to income, all else being equal, are more like-
ly to have trouble paying their mortgages. To measure 
the loan-to-income ratio, I divide the amount of the loan 
by the borrower’s reported income from the HMDA 
data.21 Figure 4 (p. 10) charts this ratio for the three 
types of lenders over the sample period. Several things 
are apparent from the data. On average, IMBs lend more 
per dollar of income than banks do (see also table 1, 
panel A, second row). While not shown in the figure, 
mortgages issued by thrift banks have a higher average 
loan-to-income ratio than do mortgages issued by com-
mercial banks, and the mortgages made by credit unions 
have the lowest ratio of all lender types. The raw aver-
ages across the types of banks (table 1, panel A, sec-
ond row) indicate that local and nonlocal banks lend 
the same amount as a fraction of borrower income—
that is, 2.31. But, mortgages issued by local banks have 
a loan-to-income ratio (table 1, panel B, first row) that 
is 0.07 (7 percentage points) lower than the average 
of lenders in the markets they are in, while mortgages 
from nonlocal banks have a ratio that is only 0.02 lower, 
with the difference between 0.07 and 0.02 being statis-
tically significant. This would arise if local banks had 
made a lot of mortgages in markets where the loan-to-
income ratio was higher than in those markets where 
nonlocal banks made a lot of mortgages, so that the 
2.31 loan-to-income ratio for local banks is 0.07 below 
the average of lenders in their markets, while the 2.31 
ratio for nonlocal banks is only 0.02 below the average 
of lenders in their markets. The loan-to-income ratio for 
all lenders rose significantly over the sample period, 
from 2.08 in the first quarter of 1995 to 2.61 in the 
last quarter of 2007 (table 1, panel C, second row). 
The rate of increase of the loan-to-income ratio was 
fastest from 2000 through 2004, precisely when home 
prices were rising most quickly (see figure 4, p. 10).
A second measure of loan risk is the loan-to- 
value ratio (table 1, panel A, third row), available 
from the LPS data. This is the ratio of the mortgage 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































average loan-to-value ratio for all 
lenders is 83.07 percent (table 1, 
panel A, third row), and it decreases 
significantly over the sample period 
(table 1, panel C, third row). As with 
many of the other indicators, the 
loan-to-value ratio suggests that 
IMBs are making the riskiest loans 
and local banks are making the saf-
est ones. Panel B of table 1 (second 
row) shows that mortgages issued 
by local banks have a loan-to-value 
ratio 2.44 percentage points below 
the average of lenders in their mar-
kets, while mortgages issued by 
IMBs have a loan-to-value ratio 
1.39 percentage points above the 
average of lenders in their markets.
The FICO score (table 1,  
panel A, fourth row) is intended to 
provide a broad-based measure of 
borrower quality. It includes infor-
mation from the borrower’s other 
loans, credit history, and other rele-
vant factors. The FICO score is com-
monly used to evaluate whether to 
grant mortgages and other forms of 
consumer credit. It ranges from 300 
through 850, with a higher score 
representing a safer borrower. I use 
the FICO score at loan origination 
as another measure of borrower 
quality. The LPS data report the 
FICO score starting in 1997. As 
with the loan-to-income ratio, these 
scores indicate that borrowers with 
mortgages from IMBs are riskiest, 
since they have the lowest average 
FICO scores, and borrowers with 
mortgages from local banks are the 
safest, since they have the highest 
average FICO scores (table 1,  
panel A, fourth row, and panel B, 
third row). In contrast to the loan-
to-income ratio, however, FICO 
scores indicate that borrowers got 
safer over time. The average FICO 
score rose from 698.5 at the start  
of 1997 to 715.4 at the end of 2007 
(table 1, panel C, fourth row); this 
trend is also noted by Bhardwaj 
and Sengupta (2010) for subprime 
mortgages. The differences between 10 1Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
the trends for the loan-to-income 
ratio and FICO score could reflect 
the difference between the risk of the 
mortgage and the risk of the bor-
rower prior to getting the mortgage. 
The LPS data also contain an 
indicator of whether a loan is con-
sidered subprime (that is, loans 
graded “B” or “C,” as opposed to 
loans graded “A,” which are of 
prime quality). As noted previously, 
the LPS sample underrepresents 
subprime loans. LPS data cover 
about 58 percent of all loans at the 
end of the sample period, in 2007, 
but they only cover 33 percent of 
subprime loans. Thus, the shares of 
subprime lending in the data I use 
should be roughly doubled to get 
the share of subprime lending over-
all. However, the number of sub-
prime loans in the LPS data with 
respect to the number of subprime 
loans in mortgage-backed securities 
is relatively constant over time. 
Thus, while there are too few sub-
prime loans in the LPS sample, 
there is no reason to believe that 
percentage changes in subprime loans in the LPS data 
do not reflect the overall changes in subprime lending.
A mortgage is often classified as subprime because 
of the low credit quality of the borrower (it also could 
reflect the size of a mortgage relative to the borrower’s 
ability to repay). Over the entire sample period, IMBs 
issued fewer subprime mortgages than banks did (table 1, 
panel A, sixth row, p. 8). Examining subprime lending 
over time, I notice some interesting patterns. As illus-
trated in figure 5, from 1995 through 2001 there was 
little subprime lending at any type of lender. Nonlocal 
banks started making a significant number of subprime 
mortgages in 2002. IMBs did not start making a sig-
nificant number of these loans until 2004, but when 
they did, subprime mortgages went from 1 percent of 
their business to 8 percent in just six months. IMBs 
seemed to use subprime loans to expand, while nonlocal 
banks added subprime lending at a time when their 
share of lending was declining (see figure 2, p. 5). 
Thus, subprime lending may have played a different 
role at the two types of lenders. When the housing 
market started to have troubles in 2005, IMBs were 
the fastest to withdraw from the subprime mortgage 
market. This is consistent with IMBs being more flex-
ible than other types of lenders. 
The measures of loan risk and borrower quality 
generally indicate that borrowers with mortgages from 
IMBs are riskier than those with mortgages from banks; 
in addition, borrowers with mortgages from local banks 
generally seem safer than those with mortgages from 
nonlocal banks. There is evidence that the riskiness 
of borrowers rose during the sample period, with the 
largest increases during 2000–04, when home prices 
were also increasing at their fastest rate (see, for ex-
ample, figures 4 and 5). 
I next turn to examining other mortgage features. 
Mortgages come in many types, but I separate them in 
two ways. First, I split fixed-rate mortgages from adjust-
able-rate mortgages (ARMs).23 On average, over three-
quarters of all mortgages had fixed rates, but this share 
moved around as mortgage rates and market conditions 
changed over the sample period. More borrowers chose 
fixed-rate mortgages when the yield curve was shallow 
or inverted relative to when it was steep.24 The propor-
tion of fixed-rate mortgages rose from 61.50 percent 
in the first quarter of 1995 to 95.28 percent in the third 
quarter of 1998; it edged down to 95.06 percent in the 
first quarter of 2001, before falling to 56.52 percent 
in the second quarter of 2005. At that point, mortgage 
FIguRE 4
Loan-to-income ratio for mortgages, by lender type
ratio
















Independent mortgage bank 
Note: See the text for details on the four periods.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act; Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics; Robert Avery, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Summary of Deposits; and Missouri Census Data Center, MABLE/Geocorr2K: 
Geographic Correspondence Engine with Census 2000 Geography.11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
market conditions made it more difficult for borrowers 
to qualify for adjustable-rate mortgages, and the propor-
tion of fixed-rate mortgages increased to 89.19 percent 
by the end of 2007 (table 1, panel C, seventh row, p. 9).
I also examine the share of so-called jumbo loans. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were government-spon-
sored enterprises (GSEs) that purchased loans from 
lenders prior to securitizing them.25 Fannie and Freddie 
could only buy loans equal to or less than a given size, 
known as the conforming loan limit; this limit ranged 
from $203,150 at the start of the sample, in 1995, to 
$417,000 at the end of the sample, in 2007.26 Loans that 
otherwise are of prime quality but are larger than the con-
forming loan limit are known as jumbo loans. For much, 
if not all, of the sample period, jumbo loans were more 
difficult to securitize than conforming loans. Thus, they 
were more likely to be kept in a lender’s portfolio. This 
may make it unsurprising that local banks made the 
largest share of jumbo mortgages (table 1, panel A, 
eighth row, p. 8).
As indicated in the prior paragraph, lenders were 
able to sell certain mortgages to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. In general, a lender had three options 
when it issued a mortgage. It could hold the mortgage 
in its portfolio. It could sell the mort-
gage to a GSE or have the mortgage 
guaranteed by a government agency 
(such as Ginnie Mae27) prior to sell-
ing the mortgage into securitization. 
Or it could sell the loan to a private 
financial intermediary, often as a 
prelude to securitization. Since the 
selling process can take time, I use 
the status of the mortgage 24 months 
after origination as my measure of 
whether it is held in portfolio, secu-
ritized with a GSE or government 
guarantee, or sold to a private firm.28 
My measure may introduce a bias 
because a mortgage is more likely 
to end up at one of the large servicers 
in the LPS data if it is securitized. 
The evidence on loan sales and se-
curitization is likely to be indicative 
of differences across the types of 
lenders, but not of the true levels  
of where mortgages are held. Not 
surprisingly, local banks hold a 
greater percentage of their mortgages 
in portfolio and, in total, sell a lower 
percentage of their mortgages than 
nonlocal banks and IMBs (table 1, 
panel A, ninth, tenth, and eleventh rows, p. 8). The 
government share, which comprises mortgages  
securitized with a GSE or government guarantee, is 
highest at nonlocal banks (table 1, panel A, eleventh 
row, p. 8).
The loan characteristic variables are consistent 
with local banks making safer loans than other types 
of lenders. This may be because they have a different 
business model for mortgages, as evidenced by the fact 
that they keep a larger share of these loans in their port-
folios. The data on borrower quality and loan character-
istics suggest systematic differences across lender types. 
Impact of lender types on local market 
lending standards
In this section, I extend the examination of whether 
mortgage lending and mortgage terms in a local mar-
ket are related to the types of lenders in that market. 
In the previous section, I showed that mortgage lend-
ing standards are correlated with the market shares of 
different types of lenders. But the simple statistics do 
not allow us to determine whether the presence of 
one type of lender affects the mortgages offered by 
other types of lenders. Here, I use a regression model 
to tease this out. 
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The baseline model allows lending standards to 
be a function of lender types and market conditions:
1)  Lending standardsi,c,t = f(Lender sharesi,c,t – 1 , 
  Lending market conditionsc,t – 1 , Economic 
  conditionsc,t – 1),
where i is the type of lender (local bank, nonlocal 
bank, or IMB), c refers to the local market (county), 
and t is the time period. The right-hand side variables 
are all lagged one quarter to mitigate potential endo-
geneity problems.29 
The characteristics I examine are those that focus 
on lending standards. The loan-to-income ratio and 
the loan-to-value ratio are direct measures of loan 
risk, while the FICO score and the share of subprime 
loans are measures of borrower quality (of course, a 
high-quality borrower with a high FICO score can 
nonetheless take a risky loan—for example, one with 
a very high loan-to-income ratio). Classifying the loan 
denial rate along these lines is more difficult. Loans 
can be denied either because a borrower has a weak 
profile or because the loan is too risky given the qual-
ity of the borrower. Thus, it mixes loan risk and borrower 
risk. Each of these characteristics can be affected by 
competitive conditions in a market, which include the 
different incentives of each type of lender. 
I use each lending standard as both a dependent 
variable and a control because each can pick up aspects 
of market conditions other than differences across 
lenders. A high average loan-to-income ratio can re-
flect borrowers needing to commit a larger share of 
income in order to purchase a home in markets where 
homes are relatively expensive. Similarly, expensive 
homes may reduce the percentage down payment that 
borrowers can make, leading to a higher loan-to-value 
ratio. Additionally, in the recent crisis, some borrowers 
with loan-to-value ratios above 100 percent have walked 
away from their mortgages because they have negative 
equity in their homes. The risk of this happening is 
obviously higher when a mortgage has a larger initial 
loan-to-value ratio. More lender competition can reduce 
average FICO scores or lead to fewer loans being de-
nied.30 Similar to the loan-to-income ratio, the share 
of subprime loans in a market may be correlated with 
home prices in the market. Of course, it can also be 
affected by competition among lenders and changes 
in securitization markets. 
Some aspects of loan quality that have a weaker 
correlation with loan risk are included as controls but 
not as dependent variables. The share of loans kept in 
portfolio is likely to be related to the types of lenders 
in a market. There may be a weak correlation with 
risk because it is more difficult to securitize unusual 
loans. The proportion of fixed-rate mortgages may  
reflect borrower strength, especially in later years when 
borrowers often qualified for mortgages based on their 
ability to meet the initial loan payments. The ability 
of borrowers of a given income and risk to qualify  
for larger adjustable-rate mortgages than fixed-rate 
mortgages means that, all else being equal, fixed-rate 
mortgages were safer to fund.
A number of the lending market standard variables 
are affected by the ability of potential borrowers to 
purchase a home. I control for prices in two ways. First, 
I include the percentage change in home prices over 
the past quarter in the local market (so the change in 
period t – 1 is the percentage difference from period 
t – 2 to period t – 1). I measure prices using the FHFA 
HPI. There is an extensive debate in the housing liter-
ature about what the best price index is (see Rosen, 
2008; and Case and Shiller, 2003). I choose the FHFA 
HPI because it is available for a wider number of mar-
kets than other constant-quality indexes, such as the 
Standard and Poor’s/Case–Shiller Home Price Index. 
The second control I use is the price-to-rent ratio in 
the local market. I measure rents using the owners’ 
equivalent rent component of the Consumer Price  
Index (CPI-OER), which is put out by the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. The price-to-rent ratio is, thus, the 
ratio of the FHFA HPI to the CPI-OER. A high value 
indicates that owning a home is expensive relative to 
renting. For both controls, I use the data for the MSA 
that a market is in if available. Otherwise, statewide 
data are used.
I also add additional controls for local economic 
conditions. These include measures of the unemploy-
ment rate and income per capita.31 For both variables, 
I use the mean value for the MSA a county is in if 
that is available. Otherwise, I use the mean value for 
the state. To pick up any systematic local differences 
not captured by the other controls, I include county-
level dummies in the main regression.
There were secular trends in many of the lending 
market standards; for example, the rise of securitiza-
tion and the increased use of the “originate-to-distrib-
ute” model for mortgages during the run-up in home 
purchases (see figure 1, p. 5) affected the mortgages 
lenders issued (see, for instance, Keys et al., 2010). 
Such trends may have given lenders an incentive  
to issue high loan-to-income, high loan-to-value, or 
low FICO-score mortgages. To control for the com-
mon effects of the rise and fall of securitization,  
I include time dummies in the regressions. The time 
dummies also pick up other changes in lending tech-
nology, economic conditions, and interest rates that 13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 2
Effect of mortgage and market characteristics  
on loan-to-income ratio in local markets,  
by lender type
  Loan-to-income ratio at:
      Independent
  Local  Nonlocal  mortgage
  banks  banks  banks
          
Local bank share  0.223*  0.073  – 0.250***
  (0.057)  (0.382)  (0.002)
Nonlocal bank share  – 0.259**  0.175**  – 0.320***
  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.000)
Loan-to-value ratio   – 0.077  0.138  0.212
  (0.685)  (0.527)  (0.284)
FICO score  – 0.001**  – 0.000  – 0.000
  (0.048)  (0.146)  (0.415)
Loan denial rate   – 0.002  – 0.047  0.097
  (0.986)  (0.377)  (0.201)
Subprime share   0.292  0.003  – 0.319**
  (0.103)  (0.980)  (0.029)
Portfolio share   – 0.026  – 0.058  0.005
  (0.775)  (0.531)  (0.958)
Fixed-rate mortgage share   – 0.027  – 0.029  – 0.044
  (0.657)  (0.542)  (0.609)
Unemployment rate   0.131  – 0.070  0.653**
  (0.823)  (0.821)  (0.047)
Income per capita  – 0.000*  0.000*  – 0.000**
  (0.096)  (0.078)  (0.017)
Change in home price   – 0.353  – 0.580  0.050
  (0.166)  (0.312)  (0.827)
Price-to-rent ratio   0.892***  0.831***  0.814***
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared  0.513  0.391  0.373
p value for test of local bank 
share = nonlocal bank share   0.000  0.021  0.389
  * p < 0.10
  ** p < 0.05
  *** p < 0.01
Notes: FICO score indicates the Fair Isaac Corporation credit score. Full definitions  
for the variables are in the text. The regression in the first column has the loan-to-
income ratio at local banks as a dependent variable. The regression in the second 
column has the loan-to-income ratio at nonlocal banks as a dependent variable.  
The regression in the third column has the loan-to-income ratio at independent 
mortgage banks as a dependent variable. Results in parentheses directly below  
the regression coefficients are p values (of statistical difference from zero). The 
test values reported in the final row are p values for a test that the local bank 
share coefficient is equal to the nonlocal bank share coefficient. Each regression  
has 31,010 observations.  
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act; Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics; Robert Avery, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Summary of Deposits; Missouri Census Data Center, MABLE/Geocorr2K: 
Geographic Correspondence Engine with Census 2000 Geography; U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis from Haver Analytics; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from Haver 
Analytics; and Federal Housing Finance Agency, seasonally adjusted purchase-only 
House Price Index, from Haver Analytics.
are common across markets. Including time dummies 
helps me focus on how the loan shares of different 
lender types affect lending market standards.
Finally, since one objective is to  
examine how the distribution of lender 
types affects loan characteristics, I ex-
clude some small markets. To be included, 
a county must average 50 loans per quarter, 
with an average of at least five by each 
type of lender (local banks, nonlocal banks, 
and IMBs). The final data set includes 
observations for all county-quarters with 
mortgage market and local economic data. 
There are 31,010 observations, covering 
800 counties during 52 quarters.32 This is 
an unbalanced panel, since newly created 
counties are added when they appear in 
the data.
One issue with using aggregate lend-
ing market standards is that it is not pos-
sible to determine whether the resultant 
correlations reflect the effect of competition 
among lenders as opposed to just a change 
in the mix of lenders. To focus on the re-
lationship between the mortgage shares of 
different lender types and the characteristics 
of mortgages, I separately consider mort-
gages by each type of lender in a market. 
That is, for each lending characteristic,  
I run separate regressions for the average 
characteristics of local banks, nonlocal 
banks, and IMBs. 
Table 2 presents the coefficient esti-
mates for regressions of equation 1, using 
the loan-to-income ratio for the mortgages 
that each type of bank has made as the 
dependent variable. The first column re-
ports the results for local banks. The posi-
tive sign on the coefficient for the local 
bank share of the market (first row) im-
plies that as the proportion of mortgages 
in a market issued by local banks increas-
es, the average loan-to-income ratio on 
all mortgages issued by local banks in that 
market increases. Shifting the mortgage 
share from IMBs (the omitted variable)  
to local banks is associated with an increase 
in the loan-to-income ratio, with a one 
standard deviation increase in the local 
bank share (3.12 percent, as given in table 1, 
panel A, first row, p. 8) implying a 0.70 
percent increase (3.12 × 0.223), or about 
2.4 percent of its mean (0.70/28.46). The 
coefficient on the nonlocal bank share is negative (sec-
ond row of table 2). This means that shifting loan share 
from IMBs to nonlocal banks reduces the average 14 1Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
loan-to-income ratio at local banks in the market. Also, 
the coefficients on the local bank share and the nonlocal 
bank share (first and second rows of table 2) are signif-
icantly different from one another (as shown in the fi-
nal row of the table, which gives the p value for a test 
that the two coefficients are equal). So, a movement 
in lending from nonlocal banks to local banks is asso-
ciated with significant increases in the loan-to-income 
ratio at local banks. 
The results for the loan-to-income ratio at nonlocal 
banks and IMBs are presented in the second and third 
columns of table 2. One common element in all three 
regressions is that when the loan market share of a 
particular type of lender is increasing, the average loan-
to-income ratio of mortgages from that type of lender 
increases. This is indicated by the positive coefficients 
on local bank share in the local bank regression (first 
row, first column) and on nonlocal bank share in the 
nonlocal bank regression (second row, second column). 
It is also indicated by the negative coefficients on both 
bank shares in the IMB regression (first and second rows, 
third column); both local and nonlocal bank shares 
decreasing means that the IMB share is increasing. 
When one type of lender increases its market share  
in period t – 1, mortgages from that type of lender are 
riskier, all else being equal, in period t. As described 
previously, the loan-to-income ratio for mortgages  
issued by local banks changes when there is a shift  
in market share between nonlocal banks and IMBs 
(second row, first column). This ratio, however, does 
not change for mortgages issued by nonlocal banks 
when there is a shift in market share between local 
banks and IMBs (first row, second column). Similarly, 
mortgages issued by IMBs do not change their loan-
to-income ratio when market share shifts between lo-
cal and nonlocal banks (final row, third column).
I now briefly discuss the coefficients on the other 
control variables in table 2. These are representative 
of the coefficients on later regressions. There is gen-
erally only a weak correlation among the measures  
of borrower quality. For example, in table 2, the coef-
ficients on FICO score (fourth row) and the subprime 
share (sixth row) are each significant in only one re-
gression, while the coefficients on the loan-to-value 
ratio (third row) and the loan denial rate (fifth row) 
are not significant for any of the regressions.
Changes in some of the macroeconomic factors 
featured in table 2 can affect the loan-to-income ratio 
at the different lender types. Higher income (tenth row) 
is associated with an increase in the loan-to-income 
ratio in the mortgages made by nonlocal banks, but a 
reduction in the loan-to-income ratio in the mortgages 
made by local banks and IMBs. This may indicate that 
changes in local income are associated with shifts among 
lender types. When the price-to-rent ratio (twelfth row) 
increases, buying a home is relatively more expensive 
than renting one. This makes it likely that when people 
do buy a home, they are not able to afford a large down 
payment, and thus they have a large loan-to-income ratio.
Table 3 presents the coefficients on the lender 
share variables for regressions of equation 1, using 
the averages of the loan characteristics by lender type 
as the dependent variables. This repeats the regressions 
in table 2 and also includes regressions where the de-
pendent variables are the loan-to-value ratio, FICO 
score, loan denial rate, and subprime mortgage share. 
The other controls, although not shown, are the same 
as those for the regressions in table 2.
Two patterns are apparent from table 3. First, 
changes in lender shares have a different impact on 
loan risk characteristics than on borrower quality 
characteristics (here, the loan denial rate looks more 
similar to a loan risk characteristic than a borrower 
quality characteristic). While changes in lender shares 
are associated with riskier mortgages as measured by 
the loan risk indicators, such changes are associated 
with less risky mortgages as measured by borrower 
quality indicators. For example, an increase in the local 
bank share is associated with smaller loan-to-income 
and loan-to-value ratios and a larger loan denial rate 
at IMBs (third column), all indicating less risky mort-
gages. However, this increase is also associated with 
lower FICO scores and more subprime lending, which 
indicate lower-quality borrowers. One possible expla-
nation is that high-quality borrowers were taking out 
risky loans; that is, borrowers with higher FICO scores 
took out loans that were risky enough to be classified 
subprime. Consistent with this interpretation, others have 
documented that FICO scores of subprime loans have 
increased since 2000 (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 
2009; and Bhardwaj and Sengupta, 2010). However, 
an analysis of why direct measures of loan risk seem to 
move in the opposite direction as measures of borrower 
quality is beyond the scope of this article.
A second pattern in table 3 is that, as a particular 
type of lender increases market share, the loans made 
by that type of lender tend to get riskier. As noted pre-
viously, the loan-to-income ratio for mortgages made 
by a lender type is larger as the own-type lender share 
increases.33 The loan-to-value ratio increases and the 
share of loans denied decreases in these circumstances. 
The picture for subprime shares is mixed, with local 
banks (first column) having a larger share of subprime 
lending when local bank share increases, but nonlocal 
banks and IMBs (second and third columns) having the 
opposite reaction to own-type lender share increases 15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 3
Effect of mortgage and market characteristics on loan risk and borrower quality
in local markets, by lender type
        Independent
Dependent variable  Independent variable  Local banks  Nonlocal banks  mortgage banks 
       
Loan-to-income ratio  Local  0.223*  0.073  – 0.250***
  Nonlocal  – 0.259**  0.175**  – 0.320***
     Test: Local = Nonlocal    0.000  0.021  0.389
Loan-to-value ratio  Local  0.078*  0.007  – 0.075***
  Nonlocal  – 0.077**  0.066***  – 0.052***
     Test: Local = Nonlocal    0.000  0.000  0.035
FICO score  Local  104.930**  11.686  – 144.131***
  Nonlocal  10.050  15.958  – 81.212***
     Test: Local = Nonlocal    0.013  0.726  0.023
Loan denial rate  Local  – 0.076***  – 0.071***  0.255***
  Nonlocal  – 0.016  – 0.176***  0.308***
     Test: Local = Nonlocal    0.000  0.000  0.021
Subprime share  Local  0.026**  0.000  0.026***
  Nonlocal  – 0.017*  – 0.016**  0.023***
     Test: Local = Nonlocal    0.000  0.018  0.522
  * p < 0.10
  ** p < 0.05
  *** p < 0.01
Notes: FICO score indicates the Fair Isaac Corporation credit score. Full definitions for the variables are in the text. Coefficients on lender share 
variables are reported. Local is the coefficient on the local bank share, and nonlocal is the coefficient on the nonlocal bank share (independent 
mortgage bank share is the omitted variable). The regressions on which these are based include all the control variables for the regressions 
reported in table 2. The dependent variables for these regressions in the local banks column are the local bank average for the variable given in 
the leftmost column. Other dependent variables are similarly defined. The test values reported are p values for a test that the local bank share 
coefficient is equal to the nonlocal bank share coefficient. All regressions except those with FICO score as the dependent variable have 31,010 
observations. The regressions with FICO score as the dependent variable have 26,445 observations.  
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act; Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics; 
Robert Avery, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits; Missouri 
Census Data Center, MABLE/Geocorr2K: Geographic Correspondence Engine with Census 2000 Geography; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
from Haver Analytics; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from Haver Analytics; and Federal Housing Finance Agency, seasonally adjusted purchase-
only House Price Index, from Haver Analytics.
(see note 33). Consistent with the differences between 
own-type share changes and other-type share changes, 
there is generally a statistically significant difference 
between the coefficients on the local bank share and 
the nonlocal bank share (p values for these tests are 
reported in the table).
Lending standards at local banks seem to shift more 
after there are changes in nonlocal bank share, com-
pared with the lending standards at nonlocal banks fol-
lowing changes in local bank share. To see this, compare 
the coefficients on nonlocal bank share in the first 
column with the coefficients on local bank share in 
second column of table 3. This shows that a shift in 
mortgage shares from IMBs to nonlocal banks is  
associated with a decrease in the risk of mortgages  
issued by local banks, while a shift from IMBs to local 
banks has little impact on the risk of mortgages issued by 
nonlocal banks. For instance, when the nonlocal bank 
share increases, the loan-to-income and loan-to-value 
ratios for mortgages issued by local banks decrease, 
indicating safer loans (table 3, second and fifth rows,   
first column). However, an increase in the local bank 
share has no significant impact on these ratios for 
mortgages made by nonlocal banks (table 3, first  
and fourth rows, second column). 
It is instructive to compare the results in table 3 
with those in panel A of table 1 (p. 8). As shown in  
panel A of table 1, mortgages issued by local banks 
have the lowest loan-to-income and loan-to-value  
ratios. Yet, as the coefficients on local bank share  
in the first column of table 3 show, when local bank 
lender share increases in a market, loans issued by  
local banks tend to have higher risk (that is, higher 
loan-to-income ratios, higher loan-to-value ratios,  
a greater likelihood to be subprime, and lower loan 
denial rates). In addition, as market share shifts from 
IMBs to nonlocal banks, mortgages issued by nonlocal 
banks generally increase in risk, as indicated by the 
coefficients on nonlocal bank share in the second  
column of table 3. Specifically, the loan-to-income 16 1Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 4
Summary statistics for counties in large and
small metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
  Top 50  Non-top-50 
  (large) MSAs  (small) MSAs
    Standard    Standard
  Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation
Local bank share  22.3  16.8  26.4  22.5
Nonlocal bank share  44.9  17.9  45.2  22.1
Independent mortgage  
  bank share  32.7  13.9  28.5  17.2
Loan-to-income ratio  2.36  0.40  2.13  0.50
Loan-to-value ratio  83.1  5.5  84.6  5.0
FICO score  705.17  19.75  702.61  20.85
Loan denial rate  17.8  8.5  22.3  11.1
Subprime share  2.6  3.7  2.8  4.6
Fixed-rate mortgage share  78.9  16.6  84.7  13.4
Jumbo share  7.3  12.0  2.5  6.2
Portfolio share  7.7  6.6  6.7  7.1
Private share  22.0  12.3  18.9  12.9
Government share  70.4  14.8  74.4  14.3
Unemployment rate  4.6  1.2  4.9  2.0
Income per capita   33,932   7,146   27,660   6,049 
          
Share of market  59.67     40.33   
Notes: All values are in percent except those for loan-to-income ratio; FICO score, 
which indicates the Fair Isaac Corporation credit score; and income per capita, which 
is in dollars. Full definitions for the variables are in the text. A county is considered 
a large-MSA county if it is in one of the 50 largest metropolitan divisions/MSAs, 
according to the 2000 U.S. Census. Otherwise, it is considered a small-MSA county. 
See the text for further details. Certain shares may not total because of rounding.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act; Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics; Robert Avery, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Summary of Deposits; Missouri Census Data Center, MABLE/Geocorr2K: Geographic 
Correspondence Engine with Census 2000 Geography; U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis from Haver Analytics; and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from Haver Analytics.
and loan-to-value ratios increase and the 
loan denial rate decreases, consistent with 
riskier lending practices (although the share 
of subprime loans decreases, pointing in 
the other direction). One interpretation 
consistent with this is that lenders compete 
more with lenders of the same type than 
lenders of other types, and competition 
manifests itself in allowing borrowers to 
take larger loans relative to both borrower 
income and home values. Of course, this 
does not necessarily mean that lenders are 
providing mortgages to riskier borrowers. 
Borrowers with mortgages from local 
banks have the highest FICO scores, but 
competition among local banks does not 
seem to lower the average FICO score of 
borrowers who get their mortgages from 
local banks. 
Since the proportion of local bank 
lending fell during most of the sample pe-
riod, until the housing crisis started in late 
2005 (recall figure 2, p. 5), we can think 
about how this might have changed lend-
ing standards. As local banks made fewer 
loans in a market, loan risk decreased at 
local banks and increased at IMBs. To the 
extent that lender share by local banks 
was lost to nonlocal banks and IMBs, the 
net effect on loan risk at nonlocal banks 
was small. It is important to remember 
that there are time dummies in these re-
gressions, so any changes are above and 
beyond secular trends across lender types. 
Lending standards and  
market size
The markets in the sample range from small 
counties with populations of less than 50,000 all the 
way up to the New York City area with over 10 mil-
lion residents. To see whether lenders compete the 
same way in the large metropolitan areas as elsewhere, 
I divide the sample of counties (markets) into two 
categories. I place counties in MSAs. For very large 
MSAs, I further divide them into metropolitan divisions. 
Metropolitan divisions are groups of closely tied con-
tiguous counties that serve as distinct employment 
districts. They are part of MSAs with populations of 
at least 2.5 million. I define a county as a large-MSA 
county if it is in one of the top 50 metropolitan divi-
sions/MSAs; otherwise, I define a county as a small-
MSA county. The MSAs are ranked by population 
according to the 2000 U.S. Census. The largest metro 
area is the New York–Wayne–White Plains, NY–NJ 
metropolitan division and the fiftieth largest is the 
Memphis, TN–MS–AR MSA. Table 4 presents a com-
parison of large-MSA and small-MSA counties. There 
are some significant differences between mortgage 
market conditions across large-MSA and small-MSA 
counties. However, it is not clear that one type of 
county has riskier conditions than the other type.
To see whether the differences between markets 
in large and small MSAs affect competition among 
lenders, I split the lender share variables by whether a 
market is a large-MSA or small-MSA county. Table 5 
presents results for regressions including these variables. 
The regressions include the same nonlender control 
variables as the regressions in tables 2 and 3, but only 
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The pattern of responses to mortgage share changes 
in both groups of markets is similar to that of the full 
sample—with one exception. In large-MSA markets, 
lenders, especially local and nonlocal banks, seem to 
react less to changes in market share of lenders of the 
same type. For example, a change in local bank share 
is not associated with a significant change in the loan-
to-income ratio or the loan-to-value ratio of mortgages 
issued by local banks (the coefficients 0.056 and 0.009, 
as given in the first column of table 5, are not significantly 
different from zero); also, a change in local bank share is 
not associated with a significant change in the share 
of subprime lending at the local banks (the coefficient 
–0.018 in the first column of table 5 is not significantly 
different from zero). All these coefficients are statisti-
cally significant in the similar regression for the sample 
as a whole (table 3, p. 15). This suggests that compe-
tition may be more complex in counties that are part 
of large MSAs.
Table 5 also presents tests of differences in the re-
gression coefficients across large-MSA and small-MSA 
markets. The p values reported in the columns labeled 
“Test: L = S ” are for tests of the differences between the 
coefficients in the large-MSA regressions and those in 
the small-MSA regressions. These results show little dif-
ference in how banks react to changes in local bank mar-
ket share based on MSA size. However, in large-MSA 
markets relative to small-MSA markets, changes in 
nonlocal bank lender share are generally associated with 
larger changes in local bank mortgage characteristics but 
smaller changes in nonlocal bank mortgage character-
istics. Again, this is consistent with differences in how 
lenders compete across MSAs that differ in size.
The results presented in tables 3 and 5 show that 
the distribution of lender types affects lending standards 
and loan characteristics. During the housing boom, 
the share of lending by local banks decreased, since 
both nonlocal banks and IMBs increased their market 
share. All else being equal, this means that loan risk 
and borrower quality fell for mortgages made by local 
banks, even more so in small-MSA markets than in 
large-MSA markets. To the extent that lending migrated 
to nonlocal banks from IMBs, loan risk and borrower 
quality increased for mortgages made by nonlocal banks, 
again more so in small-MSA markets than in large-
MSA markets. As the share of loans made by IMBs 
increased, loan risk and borrower quality increased  
at IMBs, in both large-MSA and small-MSA markets.
Conclusion
I examine mortgage lending during the period 
1995–2007. This was a period of extensive change in 
the mortgage market. There was a boom and bust in 
home purchases and home prices. What caused the 
boom and bust is a big question that is still being de-
bated. One possible contributing factor is the shift in 
the mortgage delivery process. During the housing boom, 
fewer and fewer borrowers got their mortgages from 
local banks; both nonlocal banks and IMBs gained mar-
ket share. This could have affected mortgage markets 
because each type of lender approaches mortgage 
lending differently. Local banks have a more intensive 
retail focus and are most likely to keep loans in port-
folio. Banks that make loans outside their local mar-
kets (nonlocal banks) are likely to use the wholesale 
lending channel for these loans, but being banks, they 
sometimes will keep loans in portfolio. In contrast, 
IMBs are wholesale lenders that sell essentially all 
the loans they originate.
The changes in market shares of lender types could 
be important because the characteristics of mortgages 
are a function of the lender type. Local banks tend to 
make loans that appear ex ante safer—for example, they 
have lower loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios. 
Thus, the market shift away from mortgages issued by 
local banks could lead to riskier mortgages being made.
The shift in lenders can also have an indirect  
effect. In part, loan characteristics for mortgages 
made by a particular type of lender may depend not 
only on that type of lender’s cost–benefit trade-off, 
but also on the competitors it faces. I show that an  
increase in the mortgage market share of a particular 
type of lender is associated with other lenders of the 
same type increasing the average loan risk of their 
mortgages; at the same time, this increase in the 
mortgage market share of a particular type of lender 
is associated with an increase in the average quality 
of their borrowers. This impact is larger in counties 
that are in small MSAs.
My analysis suggests that the efforts to get (private) 
mortgage securitization markets going again might 
affect the types of mortgages that are issued because 
of their effects on lender composition. The securitiza-
tion market facilitates the wholesale lending channel, 
and is likely to increase the share of loans made by 
nonlocal banks and IMBs. These loans tend to be riskier 
on average than loans made by local banks. In addition, 
the indirect effect of changing the market structure 
may be to increase loan risk even further at nonlocal 
banks and IMBs, although not at local banks. Hence, 
both the direct and indirect effects may add to aggre-
gate loan risk. 19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1For example, see Steverman and Bogoslaw (2008).
2Subprime lending is the issuing of loans to borrowers with poor 
or no credit histories; mortgage securitization is the packaging and 
sale of bonds that have mortgages as the underlying collateral. In 
addition, see U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (2007)— 
a report on the housing crisis that centers around subprime lending.
3Inside Mortgage Finance Publications (2008).
4Previous work has examined how the structure of the mortgage 
industry has affected discrimination in lending (see Apgar, 
Bendimerad, and Essene, 2007).
5This is similar to the approach in the literature examining how 
the size and organizational structure of competitors in banking 
markets can affect deposit rates and small market lending (Rosen, 
2007a; Berger, Rosen, and Udell, 2007; and Park and Pennacchi, 2009).
6The values cited here are from my calculations based on data from 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act; Robert Avery, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits.
7One would expect that brokers would lead borrowers to the lender 
offering the best deal. However, there are allegations that some brokers 
steered borrowers toward loans that maximized the brokers’ com-
missions rather than minimized the borrowers’ costs (see, for example, 
the comments of Senator Christopher J. Dodd, D-CT, in 2007 at 
http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/4167).
8See Wholesale Access Mortgage Research and Consulting Inc. (2005). 
9There is an intermediate case, where a small lender originates a 
loan and then quickly sells it to a large wholesale lender under  
prearranged terms. See Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene (2007)  
for a more detailed discussion of the different origination channels.
10This is derived from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
data described later in the article.
11An important feature of the FICO score is that it is intended to 
measure a borrower’s creditworthiness prior to taking out a mort-
gage. FICO scores range between 300 and 850. Typically, a FICO 
score above 800 is considered very good, while a score below 620 
is considered poor. As reported on the Fair Isaac Corporation web-
site (www.myfico.com), in June 2009 borrowers with FICO scores 
above 760 were able to take out 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, or 
FRMs (see note 20), at interest rates that were 160 basis points 
lower, on average, than those available for borrowers with scores 
in the 620–639 range. 
12Later in the article, I explain exactly how I divide the sample into 
large-MSA counties and small-MSA counties.
13For details, see Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(2008). In general, very small lenders are exempt from filing, as 
are lenders that do not make loans in metropolitan statistical areas.
14The major excluded group is loans to refinance existing mortgages. 
The share of loans that are for refinancing varies over time, influ-
enced in large part by the pattern of mortgage interest rates. I exclude 
these loans for two main reasons. First, the exclusion makes it easier 
to determine the role played by the lender, since I do not have to 
control for changes in the mix of loans. Second, borrowers’ current 
lenders may have an advantage in capturing refinancing loans, and 
this means that the history of lender activity may be more important 
for refinancings than for purchase loans. Also excluded are home 
equity lines, which are revolving lines of credit with a home serv-
ing as collateral. Since these loans are not generally completely 
drawn at initiation, their pricing and characteristics may vary from 
those of basic mortgages.
15The different types of depository institutions reflect differences in 
their charters and regulators, as well as historical differences in the 
types of loans they issue. A commercial bank’s primary federal reg-
ulator is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Reserve, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Thrift 
banks are regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision; and credit 
unions are regulated by the National Credit Union Administration.  
16The classification is based on a data set provided by Robert Avery, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
17The HPI is an index based on repeat sales information. It comes 
from the FHFA, which was established in 2008 by the Federal Housing 
Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, a part of the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008. The FHFA was formed by a merger 
of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), 
the Federal Housing Finance Board, and the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s government-sponsored enter-
prise mission team (see www.fhfa.gov for additional details). The 
HPI was formerly published by OFHEO.
18I have no information on branch locations for credit unions, so 
I assume all mortgages made by credit unions are in markets where 
they have branches (that is, I assume all mortgages issued by credit 
unions are local bank mortgages).
19A small number of loan applications that are approved but not 
taken are dropped from this calculation.
20A fixed-rate mortgage is one whose interest rate is fixed from its 
origin for its entire term.
21The LPS data include the ratio of the initial mortgage payment to 
the borrower’s monthly income from 2005 on. The cross-sectional 
pattern of the data is similar to that for the loan-to-income ratio in 
the HMDA data.
22I drop all observations where the loan-to-value ratio is above 
250 percent, as these likely represent data errors.
23Unlike an FRM, whose interest rate is fixed from its origin for its 
entire term, an ARM’s interest rate can adjust periodically based  
on terms set in the mortgage contract. When an ARM resets after 
an initial defined period (which may be as short as one year or as 
long as seven), the interest rate and, consequently, the monthly 
mortgage payment may change substantially.
24A yield curve shows the relationship between yields and maturity 
dates for a set of similar bonds, usually Treasuries, at a given point 
in time. A steep yield curve means that ARMs tend to have much 
lower initial interest rates than do FRMs; the interest differential is 
small when the yield curve is relatively flat.
25The full official name for Fannie Mae is the Federal National 
Mortgage Association. The full official name for Freddie Mac  
is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. The two  
government-sponsored enterprises were put into conservatorship  
in 2008.20 1Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
26This is the limit for a single-family home, which was set by the 
OFHEO and is now set by the FHFA. There were higher limits for 
multifamily homes.
27The full official name of Ginnie Mae is the Government National 
Mortgage Association.
28For mortgages that leave the data prior to 24 months (which often 
reflects repayment or default), I use the status in the last month the 
mortgage is in the data to measure its disposition.
29Including additional lags does not qualitatively change the results.
30FICO scores are only available from 1997 onward. For earlier 
years, the FICO score variable is set to zero when it is used as a 
control. In these years, the average FICO score for the nation is 
captured by time dummies.
31Income per capita is only available at an annual frequency. 
I linearly interpolate across quarters. The data come from the  
U.S. Department of Commerce and are based on population esti-
mates by the U.S. Census Bureau. The unemployment data are 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
32Our restrictions on the number of loans eliminate 115 smaller 
counties from the sample.
33To find what happens when the own-type lender share for IMBs 
increases, one would have to take the negative of the reaction to  
an increase in the lender shares of local and nonlocal banks.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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